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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
tainly contrary to proper conceptions of correct control and regulation
of the liquor business.
With a decision such as State v. Grams, supra, as law, proprietor
licensees will find it behooves them to hire only honest, reliable opera-
tors who will obey all provisions of the law, in order to protect them-
selves from prosecution.
JANE O'MELIA.
Federal Procedure-Applicability of Discovery Procedure under
Federal Rules to the United States.--In an action by the United
States, the General Motors Corporation and others were charged with
engaging in conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce. The defend-
ants answered and filed forty-five interrogatories under Rule 33 of the
Rules of Federal Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following Sec. 723c, which
they asked the government to answer. It was contended by the Gov-
ernment that Rule 33 "substitutes interrogatories for a bill of dis-
covery"; that the United States has never consented to be a defendant
in such a bill, or to answer interrogatories; and that the rule substan-
tially changes legal rights. The court held that while an action does
not lie against a sovereign except by consent and while the United
States could not be compelled to make discovery in an action brought
for that purpose, still the government in bringing a civil action against
an individual may be subjected to the ordinary rules governing pro-
cedure in the court in which the suit is brought and that, accordingly,
the Government could be required to answer the interrogatories.
United States v. General Motor Corporation, 2 F.R.D. 528 (N.D. Ill.
E.D. 1942).
In the instant case, the court pointed out that although Rule 33
does not specifically include the United States as subject to it, the fact
that Rule 37(f) which provides that the payment of attorney's fees
imposed for failure to answer interrogatories are not to be imposed on
the United States, shows that Rule 33 was meant to apply to the
United States. It might further be pointed out that a reading of the
Federal Rules as a whole indicates that they were meant generally to
apply to the Government as well as any other party to a civil action.
Rule 12 specifically extends the time within which the United States
may plead to sixty days. Rule 4 makes an exception of the United
States in the procedure of service of process on the United States.
And most imperative is Rule 81 wherein all the exceptions to the
Rules are cited: and nowhere in Rule 81 is the United States exempt
from the general application of the Rules. And furthermore, the cases
have consistently held that in a civil action the United States takes
the same position as any other private suitor. United States v. National
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RECENT DECISIONS
City Bank of New York (C.C.A., N.Y., 1936) 83 F. (2d) 236; Pollen
v. Ford Instrument Co. (United States, Intervener) (D.C. N.Y. E.D.,
1939) 26 F. Supp. 583; In re Construction Material Corp., (D.C., D.
Del. 1936) 18 F. Supp. 509; United States v. Standard Oil Co., (D.C.
S.D. Cal. N.D. 1937) 21 F. Supp. 645.
Some consideration should perhaps be given to the contention of
the Government in the instant case to the effect that Rule 33 "substi-
tutes interrogatories for a bill of discovery" and that the United States
has never consented to be a defendant in such a bill. Prior to the adop-
tion of the Federal Rules, Equity Rule 58 governed the procedure for
obtaining discovery before trial both in suits in equity in which some
relief other than discovery was sought, and in suits in equity brought
solely for discovery in aid of an action at law. And the practice of the
states permitting discovery were not applicable in actions at law in
the Federal Courts since it was held that this field was preempted by
federal statutes. Ex parte Fisk (1855) 113 U.S. 713, 5 S.Ct. 724, 28
L.Ed. 1117; Carpenter v. Winn, (1911) 221 U.S. 533, 31 S.Ct. 683,
55 L.Ed. 842. Discovery before trial in an action at law could be ob-
tained by filing a bill in equity for discovery in aid of an action at
law. And the party seeking to obtain the discovery had to make the
opposing party a defendant to the bill in equity. Here seems to be the
basis for the Government's objection to Rule 33 in the instant case.
The suit in equity to obtain a discovery was an action separate and
distinct from the action at law which such suit was supposed to aid.
Rule 33 embodied for the most part the substance of Equity Rule
58. But under the Federal Rules there are no suits in equity or actions
at las as such, but only civil actions. Thus, in a civil action formerly
denominated legal or equitable, it is not necessary to institute a sep-
arate action for discovery, but either party may obtain discovery before
trial either by taking depositions upon oral examination or upon writ-
ten interrogatories or by serving written interrogatories upon each
adverse party. Federal Rules 26 to 33. However, while the new rules
render the ancient bill of discovery obsolete for most purposes, still
it seems that a bill for discovery would in substance be a proper pro-
ceeding under the Federal Rules where the plaintiff cannot without it
find out whom he should sue since the Rules do not provide for dis-
covery before the filing of the complaint. Pressed Steel Car Co. v.
Union Pac. R. Co., (S.D. N.Y., 1917) 240 Fed. 135 and 241 Fed. 964;
Arms & Drury, Inc. v. Burg, (C.A.D.C., 1937) 90 F. 2d 400.
While the court in the instant case makes Rule 33 applicable to the
United States, there is no implication that there are no limits to discov-
ery by a party adverse to the United States. In United States v. Hart-
mann, (D.C. E.D. Pa., 1942) 2 F.R.D. 477, the Government brought
proceedings for the cancelation of the defendant's naturalization. The
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United States claimed that in his oath of allegiance the defendant made
representations which were false and fraudulent in that, at the time
he took the oath, he did not renounce allegiance to Germany but fraudu-
lently reserved it. The defendant moved for a bill of particulars. The
court held that although the office of the bill of particulars is fast
becoming obsolete because of the easily available and effective discovery
procedure, the motion for the bill of particulars would be granted and
the defendant would not be required to resort to the discovery pro-
cedure. On this point the court said: "There is of course always the
choice between a more definite statement in the complaint and dis-
closure in discovery proceedings. I can see serious objections to allow-
ing the usual sweeping discovery in a case like the present. I think
it much the wiser course to proceed with an amplified statement of the
charge, sufficient to give the defendant a fair opportunity to prepare
for trial, and with as little searching into government evidence later
on as many be possible without doing injustice to the defendant."
ANTHONY J. PALASZ.
Statutes - Filling Vacancy in Office of Governor. - Orland S.
Loomis, having been elected governor of Wisconsin by defeating the
incumbent Julius P. Heil at the November election in 1942, died after
certificate of election had been issued to him but before he had taken
the oath of office. Walter S. Goodland was elected lieutenant governor
in the same election. An original action for a declaratory judgment
was brought in the Supreme Court to determine who was entitled to
exercise the powers of the governor during the term for which the
deceased had been elected. It was held that under the provisions of
the Wisconsin Constitution the powers, duties and functions of the
office of governor devolved upon the lieutenant governor, and not on
the incumbent. State ex rel. Martin v. Heil, et al., 7 N.W. (2d) 375
(Wis. 1942).
In reaching this vital conclusion the Court took into consideration
four main question:
(1) Did the incumbent hold over beyond his two year term of
office ?
(2) If the incumbent did hold over was it only until a special
election for governor was held?
(3) If the incumbent did not hold over could he appoint a suc-
cessor as governor?
(4) Did the lieutenant governor-elect succeed to the powers and
duties of the governor?
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